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TAKING WETLANDS TO THE BANK: THE ROLE OF 
WETLAND MITIGATION BANKING IN A 




On August 24, 1993, President Clinton released his new wetlands 
protection plan.1 Entitled, "Protecting America's Wetlands: A Fair, 
Flexible, and Effective Approach," the plan purports to offer an ap-
proach that will provide sufficient protection for America's dwindling 
wetlands while also being sensitive to the concerns oflandowners.2 As 
one means of accomplishing this goal, the plan endorses the increased 
use of mitigation banking.3 The plan defines mitigation banking as 
"wetland restoration, creation, or enhancement. . . ." performed in 
advance of permitted wetland losses.4 
Environmentalists criticize the federal wetlands protection pro-
gram as being ineffective5 while the regulated community complains 
* Production Editor, 1994-1995, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 WHITE HOUSE OFF. ON ENVTL. POL'y, PROTECTING AMERICA'S WETLANDS: A FAIR, FLEX-
IBLE, AND EFFECTIVE APPROACH (Aug. 24, 1993) [hereinafter PROTECTING AMERICA'S WET-
LANDS]. 
2 [d. at 2. 
3 [d. at 16-17. 
4 [d. at 16. Elsewhere in the plan, however, mitigation banking is described as including not 
only restoration, creation, and enhancement, but also, "in certain defined circumstances, pres-
ervation" of existing wetlands. [d. at 9 (emphasis added). The issue as to whether a mitigation 
banking scheme should include preservation is the source of some disagreement. See infra text 
accompanying notes 260--265. 
5 See, e.g., Keith Schneider, Bush Announces Proposal for Wetlands, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 
1991, § 1, at 7; Dianne Dumanoski, After a Brief Flurry of Hope, Wetlands Face New Threats: 
129 
130 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 22:129 
that it is unduly burdensome.6 Despite their differences, these two 
groups agree on one point: there are significant problems with the 
current federal wetlands protection scheme.7 
Many observers feel that mitigation banking has the potential to 
significantly improve wetland regulation.8 Many environmentalists 
are skeptical, however, and fear even more rapid wetland losses if a 
banking program is adopted.9 
This Comment examines the potential of employing mitigation bank-
ing to facilitate a comprehensive wetlands policy that is "fair, flexible, 
and effective." Section II provides a backdrop for the mitigation bank-
ing issue. It begins with a brief look at the history of wetlands man-
agement in the United States, including a description of the current 
regulatory framework governing wetlands protection and the major 
criticisms it has drawn. Section III frames the issue of mitigation 
banking, and then presents the arguments that have been advanced 
for and against mitigation banking. It then examines some existing 
banking efforts and proposals to illustrate the possible forms a miti-
gation banking program might take. Part IV analyzes the role gov-
ernment should take in regulating mitigation banking. Part V sum-
marizes and concludes that in certain circumstances, and with certain 
restrictions, mitigation banking can be a valuable component of a 
national wetlands policy. 
Pending Bill Would Dramatically Alter Protection Program, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 22, 1991, at 
29. 
6 See, e.g., Peter N eurath, Wetlands' Issue: A Shoe About to Fall, PUGET SOUND Bus. J., Aug. 
6, 1990, § 1, at 1; Tim Searchinger, The Murky Waters of Wetlands Regulation, CHRIST. SCI. 
MONITOR, Aug. 26, 1991, at 19. 
7 PROTECTING AMERICA'S WETLANDS, supra note 1, at 3. See, e.g., David H. Getches, For-
ward, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 685, 687 (1989). 
8 See, e.g., Carolyn Lochhead, Clinton s Wetlands Proposal Remarkably Similar to Wilson s, 
S.F. CHRON., Aug. 25, 1993, at A4 (quoting Bob Wayland, Director of the Office of Wetlands, 
Oceans and Watersheds for the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA»; DAVID 
SALVESEN, Wetlands: Mitigating and Regulating Development Impacts 4 (1990); Leonard Shab-
man et al., Making Wetlands Mitigation Work: The Credit Market Alternative 10 (May 1993) 
(on file with Dep't of Agric. and Applied Econ., Va. Tech. U.). 
9 E.g., Wetlands, Environmentalists Concerned About Reform Plan, Gronp Representative 
Says, Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA) No. 176, D-29, (Sept. 14, 1993); Lochhead, supra note 8. 
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II. THE HISTORY OF WETLAND REGULATION 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
131 
Wetlands perform many important ecological functions. lo For exam-
ple, wetlands filter pollution,tl provide habitat for numerous species 
of animal and plant life,t2 and provide natural flood controI.t3 
The realization that wetlands are vitally important natural resources 
is relatively recent.14 Filling wetlands was not only allowed but en-
couraged, and much of urban America was once swamp.15 Many wet-
lands were also converted to farmland.16 Such conversions were seen 
as benefits to society, in that they created productive lands out of 
perceived wastelandsY As a result, over fifty percent of the wetlands 
in the United States have been destroyed.18 
10 PROTECTING AMERICA'S WETLANDS, supra note 1, at 2. See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
INST., WETLAND MITIGATION BANKING 25 (1993); ELINOR HORWITZ, OUR NATION'S WET-
LANDS 19-21 (1978). 
11 PROTECTING AMERICA'S WETLANDS, supra note 1 at 2; ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., 
supra note 10, at 25; HORWITZ, supra note 10, at 22-28. 
12 Hearings before the Subcomm. on Water Resources of the House Comm. on Public Works 
and Transportation Concerning Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1982), 
reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE 1319, 1337 (microfiche no. H641-15) (1983) 
(statement of Thomas G. Tomasello, representing the National Wildlife Federation [hereinafter 
Tomasello statement]); ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 25; JON KUSLER, OUR 
NATIONAL WETLAND HERITAGE 3 (1983); PROTECTING AMERICA'S WETLANDS, supra note 1, 
at 2. 
13 Tomasello statement, supra note 12, at 1338; ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, 
at 25; PROTECTING AMERICA'S WETLANDS, supra note 1, at 2; Robert D. Sokolove & P. Robert 
Thompson, Protecting Property Rights After the 1993 Flood: Using Wetland Banks to Manage 
the Midwest River Floodplain, WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUND. LEGAL BACKGROUNDER 34 Nov. 
5, 1993 (citing wetlands depletion as one reason for the devastating effects of flooding in the 
Midwest last year [hereinafter Sokolove & Thompson]). 
14 See SALVESEN, supra note 8, at 1. 
15 See id. Parts of Philadelphia, New York,and Boston, and all of Washington, D.C. represent 
some of the "triumphs" of early Americans in converting swamplands, which were perceived to 
be nuisances, into flourishing cities. Id. See also Charles H.W. Foster, Massachusetts Wetlands 
Restoration Through Wetlands Banking: The Rebuilding of a CommonWealth, 2-3 (July 1993) 
(on file with John F. Kennedy School of Gov't). 
16 SALVESEN, supra note 8, at 1; Foster supra note 15, at 3-4; CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE OF 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, WETLANDS: THEIR USE AND REGULATION 7 (1984) [hereinafter 
OTA REPORT], reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE 7 (microfiche no. J952-15) 
(1984). 
17 SALVESEN, supra note 8, at 1. See also Foster, supra note 15, at 3. 
18 U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE STUDY, WETLANDS OF THE UNITED STATES: CURRENT 
STATUS AND TRENDS vii (1984); THOMAS E. DAHL, WETLANDS LOSSES IN THE UNITED STATES 
1780's TO 1980's 1 (1990). 
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In the past two decades, wetlands protection has emerged as a 
central issue in the national environmental agenda.19 Today, wetlands 
regulation occurs primarily under section 404 of the Clean Water Act 
(CWA).20 Section 404 regulates "discharges" of "dredged or fill mate-
rial" into waters of the United States.21 The section 404 program is 
intended to achieve a goal of "no net loss of wetlands."22 
According to the section 404(b )(1) Guidelines developed by the EPA 
and the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps)23 and a 1990 Memorandum 
of Agreement (MOA)24 between the Corps and the EPA, the two 
agencies primarily responsible for regulating wetlands under the CWA,25 
the Corps is to follow a sequencing scheme in issuing permits. Under 
this sequencing scheme, permit applicants must either avoid adverse 
impacts to wetlands or demonstrate that such impacts are unavoid-
able.26 The next step in the sequence requires that applicants mini-
mize unavoidable adverse impacts.27 Finally, the applicant must per-
form compensatory mitigation to offset any adverse impacts that 
occur despite avoidance and minimization.28 When compensatory miti-
gation is found necessary, there is a strong regulatory preference for 
mitigation that is "on-site" and "in-kind."29 
19 Shabman et a!., supra note 8, at 1. 
20 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988). See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 9; Denis C. 
Swords, The Comprehensive Wetlands Conservation and Management Act of 1991: A Restruc-
turing of Section 404 that Affords Inadequate Protection for Critical Wetlands, 53 LA. L. REV. 
163, 166 (1992); Getches, supra note 7, at 693. 
21 33 U.S.C. § 1344. 
22 MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 
AND THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY CONCERNING THE DETERMINATION OF MITIGATION 
UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 404(b)(I) GUIDELINES, 55 Fed. Reg. 9210 (1990) 
[hereinafter MOA]. 
23 40 C.F.R. § 230 et seq. (1993). These guidelines constitute the regulations which the Corps 
must apply in evaluating applications for permits to fill wetlands. Id. § 230.2(a). 
24 MOA, supra note 22. 
25Id. The Corps is primarily responsible, under § 404, for the issuance of permits to fill or 
degrade wetlands. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1991). EPA, however, is given final review power over 
Corps decisions. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c). 
26 40 C.F.R. § 230.IO(a). In order to show that an impact is unavoidable, the applicant must 
show that there are no "practicable alternatives" to the proposed project which would have a 
less adverse impact on wetlands. Id. 
27Id. § 230.IO(c). 
28Id. § 230.10(d). Mitigation refers to actions taken to reduce the effects of a project on 
wetlands. Compensatory mitigation usually takes the form of restoration of previously degraded 
wetlands, enhancement of existing wetlands, creation of new wetlands, or preservation of 
existing wetlands. See generally MOA, supra note 22. 
29 MOA, supra note 22. On-site refers to a mitigation which is undertaken on the same parcel 
as and in close proximity to a development project which degrades wetlands. In-kind refers to 
mitigation which replaces the same wetland types and values which are lost due to development. 
See generally MOA, supra note 22. 
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The section 404 system has drawn criticism from environmentalists 
and the regulated community alike. Despite the goal of no net loss of 
wetlands, the nation continues to lose wetlands at an alarming rate.30 
This loss of wetlands may result from the emphasis placed on com-
pensatory mitigation.31 Compensatory mitigation is ineffective from 
an ecological perspective, because the science of creating, enhancing, 
and restoring wetlands is imprecise and unproved.32 For example, a 
1985 study of thirty-two wetland creation projects in Virginia re-
vealed that only nine were considered to be completely successfu1.33 
Others blame the failure of mitigation efforts on institutional flaws 
rather than any technical infeasibility of successful mitigation.34 One 
such flaw is the lack of oversight of mitigation efforts by the Corps.35 
Often, all that is required before a permit is issued is a mitigation plan 
approved by the Corps.36 As a result, some mitigation plans are never 
actually carried out or even initiated.37 
Even mitigation projects that are initiated often fail because the 
regulatory agencies lack the resources to adequately monitor them to 
see if they are succeeding.3s Even when sites are monitored, there is 
often no pre-designated party responsible for rectifying the failure.39 
Finally, even successful mitigation efforts are at risk of being de-
graded in the future because developers are not required to monitor 
and maintain the sites into the future.4o 
Critics view the sequencing scheme as overly rigid and ineffective 
because it does not consider the ill effects of fragmentation, isolation, 
and degradation of the wetlands preserved or compensated for on-
site.41 As a result, many mitigation efforts result in degraded and 
fragmented wetlands with only marginal ecological value.42 Many ob-
servers believe that wetland mitigation banking offers a solution to 
30 See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, Ending The War: A Strategy To Save America's Coastal Zone, 
47 MD. L. REV. 358 (1988). 
31 See Swords, supra note 20, at 202. 
32 See id. See generally SALVESEN, supra note 8, at 77-107. 
33 See SALVESEN, supra note 8, at 96. 
34 See Shabman et ai., supra note 8, at 3. 
35 See id. at 2. 
36 [d. See also CATHLEEN SHORT, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., MITIGATION BANKING, 
BIOLOGICAL REP. 88(41), 4 (July 1988). 
37 Shabman et ai., supra note 8, at 2 (referring to the process as "paper mitigation"). 
38 See id. at 3; SHORT, supra note 36, at 4. 
39 Shabman et ai., supra note 8, at 3. 
4fJ [d. 
41 Shabman et ai., supra note 8, at 3. 
42 [d. 
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some of the problems surrounding government regulation of wet-
lands.43 
III. MITIGATION BANKING 
Mitigation banking is not an entirely new concept.44 Within the last 
decade, many entities have initiated mitigation banking programs.45 
Currently, the vast majority of mitigation banks are owned and oper-
ated by government entities.46 
In general, wetland mitigation banking refers to a system whereby 
a party creates, restores, enhances, or in some cases preserves wet-
lands to provide compensatory mitigation in advance of proposed 
discharges into wetlands.47 In some cases, the sponsor of the mitiga-
tion bank identifies the development activities to be compensated for 
prior to establishing the bank.48 In others, the bank sponsor performs 
the mitigation "speculatively to compensate for as yet unspecified 
development activities."49 
The performed mitigation is translated into "credits" according to 
a pre-arranged valuation methodology. 50 These credits can then be 
"withdrawn" and used to offset wetlands losses caused by permitted 
activities for which compensatory mitigation is deemed appropriate 
by the regulating agency.51 
A. The Mitigation Banking Debate 
The introduction of mitigation banking as a tool for wetland man-
agement has touched off yet another debate over wetlands policy.52 
43 See, e.g., William J. Haynes, II & Royal C. Gardner, Dialogues: The Value of Wetlands as 
Wetlands: The Casefor Mitigation Banking, 23 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10261. 
44 CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF FISH AND GAME, DRAFT GUIDELINES FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT 
OF WETLAND MITIGATION BANKS 2 (July 1991) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA GUIDELINES]. 
45 See SHORT, supra note 36, at iii; ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 1. 
46 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 5. 
47 See EPA REGION IX, MITIGATION BANKING GUIDANCE 2 (Dec. 20, 1991) [hereinafter 
REGION IX GUIDELINES]; SHORT, supra note 36, at iii. Note that this is a very general definition. 
Mitigation banking can take many different forms. See infra text accompanying notes 124-159. 
48 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 3 n.1. 
49 [d. 
50 See id. at 77. 
51 See, e.g., id. at 32; CALIFORNIA GUIDELINES, supra note 44, at 2-3. 
52 See, e.g., MASS. DEP'T OF ENVTL. AFF., WETLANDS RESTORATION AND MITIGATION BANK 
RESEARCH PROJECT PROPOSAL-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND 6. 
53 Lochhead, supra note 8 (quoting Bob Wayland, Director of EPA's Office of Wetlands, Oceans 
and Watersheds). See, e.g., Haynes & Gardner, supra note 43, at 10262; Sokolove & Thompson, 
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Proponents feel that mitigation banking is a "creative and innovative 
way" to achieve the no net loss of wetlands goal, and possibly to 
produce a net gain, while easing the regulatory burden on private 
property owners.53 Opponents contend that mitigation banking will 
result in even more loss of valuable and unique wetlands.54 
1. Arguments in Favor of Mitigation Banking 
a. Advance Mitigation 
Proponents of mitigation argue that mitigation banking offers nu-
merous advantages over the current system. 55 One of the main advan-
tages is that mitigation banking results in mitigation being performed 
in advance of, rather than subsequent to, wetland conversion pro-
jects.56 Advance mitigation has two principal benefits. First, advance 
mitigation eliminates concerns that once a permit is granted, mitiga-
tion may never take place.57 Under a typical mitigation banking sys-
tem, mitigation has already been performed by the time a specific 
project is permitted.58 
The second benefit of advance mitigation is that it eliminates the 
"lag time" between wetlands adulteration and mitigation that does 
occur.59 Currently, even mitigation efforts that are successfully com-
pleted usually take several years to become fully functional. 60 There 
is often a significant delay between the time an area is deprived of 
wetland functions and the reintroduction of those functions.61 Ad-
supra note 13, at 2; Ryan McCarthy, Wetlands Ideas Stir Discontent, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 
5, 1993, at Nl. 
54 See, e.g., Lochhead, supra note 8; McCarthy, supra note 53. 
55 See, e.g., E.P.A. AND ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, MEMORANDUM TO THE FIELD: ESTAB-
LISHMENT AND USE OF WETLAND MITIGATION BANKS IN THE CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 
404 REGULATORY PROGRAM 1 (Aug. 23, 1993) [hereinafter MEMORANDUM TO THE FIELDJ; 
Haynes & Gardner, supra note 43, at 10262; Shabman et aI., supra note 8, at 10-11. 
56 See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 153; REGION IX GUIDELINES, 
supra note 47, at 1; FLORIDA DEP'T OF ENVTL. REG., ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT FOR 
PROPOSED REVISIONS TO CHAPTER 17--342, F.A.C. DOCKET No. 93--25R, 8 (1993) [hereinafter 
FLORIDA ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENTJ. Some proponents of mitigation banking contend, 
however, that some credits should be allowed to be withdrawn from mitigation banks before the 
bank sites are fully functional. See infra, text accompanying notes 270--271; see also, e.g., 
Shabman et aI., supra note 8, at 26. 
57 See MEMORANDUM TO THE FIELD, supra note 55; ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 
10, at 59; Shabman et aI., supra note 8, at 3. 
58 E.g., SHORT, supra note 36, at 3. 
59 E.g., id.; MEMORANDUM TO THE FIELD, supra note 55; Haynes & Gardner, supra note 43, 
at 10262. 
60 SHORT, supra note 36, at 3. 
61 See, e.g., id. 
136 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 22:129 
vance mitigation clearly creates the inverse of this situation-a short-
term wetland surplus-because mitigation bank sites could be opera-
tional for some time before credits are withdrawn.62 
b. Consolidated and Large-Scale Mitigation Projects 
Advocates also cite the possibility of consolidated, large-scale miti-
gation efforts as one of the primary advantages of mitigation banking 
over the current site-specific system.63 Several benefits are associated 
with larger mitigation projects. 
First, proponents argue that significant ecological benefits can re-
sult from the consolidation of many smaller, individual, project-spe-
cific mitigation efforts.64 Larger, off-site wetland systems are often 
more ecologically valuable and successful than smaller wetlands.65 
On-site mitigation, in contrast, often results in small wetland patches 
that serve limited ecological functions.66 Impacts from the develop-
ment often compromise what little value still exists in the remaining 
natural wetlands as well as mitigation wetlands developed on-site.67 
Such is often the case when on-site mitigation projects are undertaken 
in the midst of housing developments and shopping centers.63 
Second, larger systems provide habitat for more types of plant and 
wildlife species.69 A greater variety of habitat types and species makes 
it more likely that a mitigation effort will succeed in the long-term 
because this allows the site to accommodate changes in the ecosys-
tem.70 In addition, larger areas are able to support larger populations 
of individual species in addition to a larger variety of species.71 This 
helps to prevent inbreeding effects which may trouble small isolated 
populations.72 
62 See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 59. 
63 E.g., id. at 32; Shabman et aI., supra note 8, at 5; SHORT, supra note 36, at 3. 
64 E.g., FLORIDA ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 56; Shabman et aI., supra note 
8, at 11; SHORT, supra note 36, at 2; MEMORANDUM TO THE FIELD, supra note 55. 
65 See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 32; SALVESEN, supra note 8, at 5. 
66 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 31. 
67Id. 
68Id. 
69 E.g., id. at 32. 
70 E.g., id. 
71 E.g., id. 
72 E.g., id. Sometimes, however, small wetlands should replace similar small wetlands lost to 
development so as to provide habitat for locally displaced species. Id. Of course, the option of 
creating larger bank sites does not necessitate the exercise of that option. Smaller mitigation 
projects could be initiated where appropriate. Id. 
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A third advantage of large-scale mitigation is that it allows for 
economies of scale. Since the costs of mitigation are usually a function 
of the mitigation site's size,73 large-scale mitigation is significantly 
more cost-efficient than small-scale, project-specific mitigation.74 Fur-
ther, the mitigation bank sponsor is able to afford consultants and 
technology that are not available to individual developers.75 Larger 
mitigation projects are therefore likely to be cheaper and of a higher 
quality than mitigation projects undertaken on a smaller scale by 
individual developers to compensate for individual projects.76 
A fourth advantage of consolidating many small mitigation projects 
into fewer large sites is that consolidation enables enforcing agencies 
to more effectively monitor mitigation projects and enforce permit 
conditions while expending fewer resources.77 When there are fewer 
sites to oversee, regulators may allocate time to revisit sites and 
determine if mitigation has been performed and is successfup8 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, consolidation of mitigation 
efforts allows for compensatory mitigation which might not otherwise 
take place.79 This benefit derives from a combination of the potential 
size of mitigation banking sites and the fact that mitigation, in a 
banking system, takes place prior to wetland impacts.8o Much of the 
wetlands degradation that takes place results from the cumulative 
impact of uncompensated fills. Some fills are too small to mitigate on 
a site-specific basis because of the inefficiency and impracticality of 
small-scale mitigation.81 
Mitigation banking allows for large mitigation sites to be completed 
in anticipation of numerous, small-scale fills.82 When such a small fill 
takes place, it is no longer valid for the developer to argue that 
mitigation is impractical, because the bank site is already functional. 
The developer can simply purchase the credits necessary to compen-
sate for the 10ss.83 Rather than having to concede that mitigation is 
73 FLORIDA ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 56, at 6. A study of the average costs 
of mitigation revealed that the average cost per acre for a five-acre project was $25,864, while 
the average cost per acre of a 500-acre mitigation project was over $2,000 less-$23,713. ld. 
74 See, e.g., id., at 6; SHORT, supra note 36, at 2-3. 
75 See, e.g., SHORT, supra note 36, at 3; SALVESEN, supra note 8, at 5. 
76 See SHORT, supra note 36, at 3; SALVESEN, supra note 8, at 5. 
77 See SHORT, supra note 36, at 4. 
78 See, e.g., id. 
79 See, e.g., SALVESEN, supra note 8, at 5. 
80 See Shabman et a!., supra note 8, at 5. 
81 See Shabman et a!., supra note 8, at 4. 
82 See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 60. 
83 See, e.g., Shabman et a!., supra note 8, at 4. 
138 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 22:129 
impractical, regulatory agencies could require permit applicants to 
purchase an appropriate number of bank credits for many small fills, 
such as those authorized under nationwide 26.84 
c. Site Selection Benefits 
Because mitigation bank sponsors choose bank sites independently 
of particular projects, they can make siting decisions based on rele-
vant factors, such as availability, size, proximity to possible degrading 
influences, and regional wetland-function needs. Bank sponsors also 
have more leeway in terms of the time-frame in which they must 
choose the site.85 Project-specific mitigation sites, on the other hand, 
often must be on-site.86 Even when off-site mitigation is allowed, the 
siting process is held captive by the need to find a site immediately.87 
This can result in costly mitigation efforts that are often not located 
in the most suitable place. 
d. Benefits to Landowners 
Landowners, and those who represent them, are outspoken sup-
porters of wetland mitigation banking.88 The main reason for land-
owner support is probably the hope that a mitigation banking scheme 
would streamline the wetlands regulatory system.89 First, landowners 
and agencies would not have to expend their time and resources on 
developing and approving many small-scale compensatory mitigation 
plans.90 This could take place on a much larger scale for each bank.91 
Second, developers would have a much better idea, at a point much 
earlier in time, of the likely cost of mitigation for a given development 
84 See id. at 13. In fact, the 1991 revisions to the nationwide permit rules encourage the use 
of mitigation banking to compensate for up to ten acres of wetland alterations. [d. 
85 See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 63. 
86 See, e.g., MOA, supra note 22. 
87 See SHORT, supra note 36, at 3. 
88 See, e.g., CHRIS MACDONALD, ROBINSON & COLE, 2 WETLANDS WATCH 3, 4 (Fall 1993); 
NATIONAL WETLANDS COALITION, ISSUE PAPER: MITIGATION BANKING SHOULD PLAY A 
CENTRAL ROLE IN THE SECTION 404 PROGRAM (Nov. 8,1993); Haynes & Gardner, supra note 
43, at 10261. 
89 See, e.g., MACDONALD, supra note 88, at 4; NATIONAL WETLANDS COALITION, supra note 
88; Haynes & Gardner, supra note 43, at 10262. 
90 See, e.g., MACDONALD, supra note 88, at 4; NATIONAL WETLANDS COALITION, supra note 
88; Haynes & Gardner, supra note 43, at 10262. 
91 See, e.g., MACDONALD, supra note 88, at 4; NATIONAL WETLANDS COALITION, supra note 
88; Haynes & Gardner, supra note 43, at 10262. 
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project.92 These costs would be significantly less than if developers 
had to perform the mitigation themselves.9:l Finally, the responsibility 
for long-term maintenance would shift from the hands of the devel-
opers, who are ill-equipped to act in that capacity, to the hands of the 
expert entities managing the banks.94 
e. Mitigation Banking as a Takings Safety Valve 
Proponents postulate that mitigation banking offers the further 
benefit of preventing regulatory takings claims under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.95 The regulatory 
takings doctrine requires the government to pay just compensation 
when government actions deprive landowners of their property.96 Wet-
land regulators often find themselves faced with this challenge when 
their regulations restrict property owners' development plans.97 
The United States Supreme Court held, in Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, that when the effect of a government regulation is 
to deny a landowner all economically viable use of his property the 
government must pay the landowner just compensation.98 The Lucas 
decision has received a great deal of attention, and many commenta-
tors have postulated that it could threaten rigorous environmental 
regulation.99 Indeed, wetlands regulation may be particularly suscep-
tible to takings challenges because seventy-five percent of America's 
wetlands are privately owned.1oo 
It should be noted, however, that the Lucas court itself stated that 
its holding would apply only in "relatively rare situations," and un-
der "extraordinary circumstance[s],"101 An examination of post-Lucas 
takings cases reveals that these "extraordinary" situations, in which 
92 See, e.g., MACDONALD, supra note 88, at 4; NATIONAL WETLANDS COALITION, supra note 
88; Haynes & Gardner, supra note 43, at 10262. 
93 See infra, text accompanying notes 212-239. 
94 See Foster, supra note 15, at 43 (summarizing statements of Garret G. Hollands, Principal 
of IEP, Inc. of Northboro, Massachusetts); SALVESEN, supra note 8, at 5. 
95 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. See Haynes & Gardner, supra note 43, at 10262. 
96 See generally John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 
18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1993). 
97 See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992); Loveladies Harbor, 
Inc. v. United States, 21 CI.Ct. 153 (1990), aff'd, _F.3d __ , 62 U.S.L.W. 2791 (Fed. Cir., June 
15, 1994); Deltona Co. v. U.S., 657 F.2d 1184 (Cl. Ct. 1981), cert denied 455 U.S. 1017 (1982). 
98 Lucas 112 S.Ct. at 2910. 
99 See, e.g., Cotton C. Harness III, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: Its Historical 
Context and Shifting Constitutional Principles, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 5 (1992). 
100 Haynes & Gardner, supra note 43, at 10262. 
101 Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2894. 
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a regulation constitutes a taking, only arise when 1) the entire parcel 
has been deprived of value, 102 and 2) the challenged regulation/restric-
tion is imposed subsequent to the challenger's acquisition of his prop-
erty interest in the restricted propertyyJ3 104 Nonetheless, wetland 
regulators do need to be cognizant of the possibility that their actions 
may sometimes constitute takings.105 
The argument that a mitigation banking system can shield regula-
tors from liability under the takings doctrine stems from the assump-
tion that land deemed undevelopable because of wetlands contained 
thereon remains valuable when such a system is in place.106 In other 
words, the argument goes, the very fact that a landowner's land is a 
critical wetland confers upon it the value of mitigation credit that can 
be used to satisfy permitting requirements for other projects.107 Thus, 
"degraded wetlands can be restored for credit, low and moderate 
value wetlands can be enhanced, and high-value wetlands can be 
preserved."l08 This theory is an extension of the decision in Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.lOg In refusing to find a 
taking, the Penn Central court cited the fact that the plaintiff was 
allowed to transfer the development rights which it was not allowed 
to use above Penn Central Station to another property.DO 
2. The Case Against Mitigation Banking 
Not everyone believes that the adoption of a mitigation banking 
system would be a change for the better. The most prevalent concern 
is that mitigation banking will result in less rigorous stewardship on 
the part of wetlands regulators. l11 Mitigation banking has been called 
10'2 See, e.g., Tabb Lakes, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1334, aff'd, 10 F.3d 796 (1992). This 
post-Lucas case affirmed what has been termed the parcel-as-a-whole, or non-segmentation 
theory, which states that a landowner cannot divide a parcel of land into those sections which 
have been regulated and those which have not and then claim that the regulated portions have 
been stripped of any value. [d. at 1346. See also, e.g., Bernardsville Quarry v. Bernardsville 
Borough, 608 A.2d 1377, 1389 (N.J. 1992). 
103 See, e.g., Presault v. United States, 27 Fed.CI. 69, 95 (1992). As did the court in Tabb Lakes, 
the Preseault court refused to find a taking. The court based its finding on the fact that the 
challenged regulation was promulgated prior to the plaintiffs' acquisition of their land. [d. 
104 See generally Michael Rubin & Jonathan Silverstein, Lucas, One Year Later: Merely a 
Footnote to the Takings Doctrine, NATL ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J. , SEPT. 1993, AT 3. 
105 See Haynes & Gardner, supra note 43, at 10262--{)3. 
106 See id. 
107 See id. at 10262. 
100 [d. 
109 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
110 [d. at 137. 
111 See, e.g., SHORT, supra note 36, at 5. 
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a "cheap trick" to enable more original wetlands to be degraded in 
exchange for less valuable compensatory mitigationY2 
The negative public perception of mitigation banking may stem 
from a belief that wetlands banks provide a justification for easing 
restrictions on the filling of wetlands.ll3 Some regulators have been 
hesitant to endorse mitigation banking because they might be per-
ceived as being willing to "forego the proper steps in project planning 
and mitigation."114 
Opponents fear that developers will exert pressure on permitting 
agencies to allow the purchase of mitigation credits in place of requir-
ing avoidanceY5 This fear is understandable, considering the histori-
cal attitude of the primary permitting agency-the Corps-that de-
velopment is more important than wetland protectionY6 
A related concern is that mitigation banking will result in a net loss 
of wetlands.ll7 If regulators grant mitigation credits for preservation 
and acquisition of existing wetlands, it is clear that a net loss will 
result when developers withdraw these credits to compensate for 
wetland fills elsewhere.118 Similarly, while enhancement may result 
in increased wetlands values, it will not result in more wetlandsY9 
Therefore, again, a net loss of wetlands occurs when wetlands en-
hancement is used as compensatory mitigation.l20 Even restoration 
and creation of wetlands may not result in replacement of wetlands 
functions of equal character and quality to those destroyed by devel-
opment in existing natural wetlands.121 
The fears that mitigation banking will result in a net loss of wet-
lands seem to focus on concerns about compensatory mitigation itself 
rather than on mitigation banking. These concerns arise under the 
present system as well.122 Mitigation banking, if instituted with the 
proper safeguards, could actually increase the ecological value of com-
112 McCarthy, supra note 53 (quoting Otis Wollan of the Placer County, CA. Water Agency). 
See also, e.g., Lochhead, supra note 8. 
113 MASSACHUSETTS DEP'T OF ENVTL. AFF., supra note 52, at 7. 
114 SHORT, supra note 36, at 5. 
115 See, e.g., SALVESEN, supra note 8, at 5. 
116 SALVESEN, supra note 8, at 33. The Corps has actually "led the nation in developing 
wetlands habitat." Id. 
117 See SHORT, supra note 36, at 6; Haynes & Gardner, supra note 43, at 10263. 
118 See, e.g., Haynes & Gardner, supra note 43, at 10263. 
119 See, e.g., SHORT, supra note 36, at 6. 
120 See, e.g., id. 
121 See supra, text accompanying notes 31-33. 
122Id. 
142 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 22:129 
pensatory mitigation. 123 The issue of how best to operate a mitigation 
banking program is discussed in the next section. 
B. Types of Banks 
Wetland mitigation banking has many proponents. But not all of its 
supporters have the same perception with respect to how mitigation 
should be implemented. 
Before a mitigation banking program is adopted, framers of the 
program must determine the institutional nature of the banks that 
will provide mitigation credits.l24 Mitigation banks can take three 
forms: single-client banks, publicly-sponsored, credit-for-sale banks, 
and privately-sponsored, credit-for-sale banks.l25 Of course, mitigation 
banking programs can allow for many types of banks.l26 
1. Single-Client 
Most existing banks are initiated and managed by a sponsor for the 
specific purpose of providing advance mitigation for wetlands degra-
dation resulting from projects undertaken by the same entity-sin-
gle-client banks.127 The most common example of a program involving 
single-client agency banks is that in which a transportation agency 
performs large-scale mitigation to compensate for small linear fills 
necessitated by its road building projects.l28 The Intermodal Surface 
1Zl See supra, text accompanying notes 55-S7. 
124 See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 43-44, 121-23; Foster, supra note 15, 
at 8-9. 
125 See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 120-23. 
126 See id. In Florida, for instance, banks could consist of large tracts of privately owned land, 
state-owned property leased by private entrepreneurs, county-owned and run banks estab-
lished to offset municipal projects, or any number of possibilities. Telephone interview with 
David Tulman, Senior Attorney with the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (Jan. 
26, 1994). [hereinafter Tulman interview]. 
According to one economic analysis of proposed mitigation banking procedures in Florida, the 
existence of public agency-sponsored banks which compete directly against other mitigation 
banks can result in substantial disadvantages to private bank owners who lack the financial 
resources of many public agencies. FLORIDA ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 56, at 
12. 
127 Shabman et ai., supra note 8, at 11 ("nearly 75 percent [of existing mitigation banks] were 
established by public agencies to compensate for the wetland impacts of public infrastructure 
projects"). E.g., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 43; Foster, supra note 15, at 9; 
Robert D. Sokolove & Pamela D. Huang, Privatization of Wetland Mitigation Banking, NAT. 
RESOURCE & ENV'T 36 (Summer 1992). 
128 See, e.g., Haynes & Gardner, supra note 43, at 10261. An example is the Company Swamp 
mitigation bank in Bertie County, North Carolina. The credits from this bank are produced by 
the North Carolina DOT and are used to offset for NC DOT wetland fills. See ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW INST., supra note 10, at apps. A & B. 
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Transportation and Efficiency Act (ISTEA)129 provides for the use of 
federal funds in facilitating the development of mitigation banks to 
compensate for wetlands losses caused by highway projects of state 
departments of transportation (DOTs).l30 Many mitigation banks have 
been established by state DOTs to compensate, in advance, for wet-
lands alterations caused by their projects.131 
Single-client mitigation banks can also be sponsored by private 
entities.132 For instance, the Tenneco Laterre Mitigation Bank in Lou-
isiana is a 7,014-acre bank sponsored by Tenneco Oil Company in 
order to compensate for future oil and gas exploration.l33 
2. Publicly-Sponsored, Credit-For-Sale Banks 
Some banks are developed by public or quasi-public entities in 
order to provide credits which they sell on a non-profit basis to devel-
opers.134 These are usually called "mitigation-fee" or "fee-based" 
banks,135 although they have also been referred to as "cooperative" 
banks.136 These banks are developed by resource agencies or non-
profit environmental groups, and the resultant credits are then sold 
for a fee.137 
The non-profit organization performs administrative and long-term 
management functions, but the funding comes from the credit pur-
chasers.l38 The fee is based on the costs of the project, such as acqui-
sition, planning, construction, management, and monitoring, in addi-
tion to a moderate profit.139 The prime example of such a bank is the 
California State Coastal Conservancy which has sponsored two miti-
gation banks: Bracut Wetland Mitigation Bank and Huntington Beach 
Bank.140 
129 Pub. L. No. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914 (1991). 
130 23 U.S.C.A. § 103(i)(13) (Supp. IV 1992). See Haynes & Gardner, supra note 43, at 1026l. 
131 See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at Apps. A & B (listing existing and 
proposed wetland mitigation banks including many single-client, state DOT-sponsored banks); 
SHORT, supra note 36, table 2 at 42 (listing several existing state DOT banks). 
132 See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at Apps. A & B (listing existing and 
proposed wetland mitigation banks including many single-client, privately sponsored banks). 
133 SHORT, supra note 36, table 2 at 42. 
1:34 See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 122; SHORT, supra note 36, at 17-18. 
1:15 Shabman et aI., supra note 8, at 11; SHORT, supra note 36, at 17. 
1:16 Foster, supra note 15, at 9. 
137 See, e.g., SHORT, supra note 36, at 17. 
138 See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 122. 
139 SHORT, supra note 36, at 17. 
140 See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at Apps. A & B. 
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This type of bank offers several advantages. First, the entities 
performing the mitigation are motivated to do so by a desire to 
protect and enhance wetland values, rather than out of a desire for 
profit or a desire to receive a permit to fill wetlands elsewhere.141 
Therefore, oversight will not be as difficult because the bank opera-
tors and regulatory agencies will desire equally high-quality mitiga-
tion.142 
Another advantage is that, in publicly-sponsored, fee-based banks, 
time and resources can be saved through the consolidation of many 
functions such as credit-production, oversight, and long-term manage-
ment of the bank site.143 In some cases where the bank sponsor is a 
resource agency, the additional function of project permitting could 
be added, thereby consolidating basically every function, apart from 
that of the client, in one entity.l44 
There are, however, perceived disadvantages with the fee-based 
system.145 Primarily, there are concerns regarding the funding of the 
mitigation efforts.l46 First, it may be difficult to find non-profit spon-
sors willing and able to bear the significant costs of mitigation for the 
indefinite period of time until credits can be sold.147 Second, although 
the fees charged per credit are intended to cover the costs of mitiga-
tion, it is often difficult to foresee all long-term maintenance costS.148 
The California Coastal Conservancy's Bracut Marsh Bank, for exam-
ple, has only recovered thirty-eight percent of the bank's costS.149 
141 See SALVESEN, supra note 8, at 5. Some publicly sponsored mitigation banks have an 
entirely different objective. The proposed Tenth West Corridor bank in Utah, for example, is 
intended to create mitigation credits in order to attract businesses to the City of Logan by 
offering free or subsidized mitigation credits. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 
123. 
142 See SALVESEN, supra note 8, at 5. 
143 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 43. 
144 [d. 
145 See, e.g., id. at 122-23; Shabman et aI., supra note 8, at 11-12; SHORT, supra note 36, at 
17-18. 
146 See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 122-23; Shabman et al., supra note 8, 
at 11-12; SHORT, supra note 36, at 17-18. 
147 See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 122; Shabman et aI., supra note 8, at 
11; SHORT, supra note 36, at 18. 
148 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 122-23; SHORT, supra note 36, at 17. 
149 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 122. Moreover, it is estimated that, even 
if all of the bank's credits were sold at the prescribed rate, only 54 percent of the costs would 
have been recouped. [d. 
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3. Privately-Sponsored, Credit-For-Sale Banks 
There has been a rising call among mitigation banking supporters 
to institute a market-based mitigation banking system.l50 Such mar-
ket-based, or entrepreneurial,151 banks would be businesses, operating 
to make profits.152 Market-based approaches to environmental protec-
tion and regulation have received a great deal of attention in recent 
years.153 The main attraction of such market-based approaches is that 
they allow for greater flexibility and efficiency than the strict regula-
tory approach.154 
Generally, market-based approaches to environmental regulation 
create a market for the right to conduct regulated activities. l55 Spe-
cifically, in the wetlands context, a marketable mitigation credit sys-
tem would involve the creation of mitigation banks by private entre-
preneurs who recognize the existence of a market for credits that 
could be produced by those banks.l56 
Proponents envisage certain benefits to follow from this. One benefit 
is that market forces would theoretically ensure that wetlands miti-
gation credits would be provided at the least cost.157 Also, it is argued 
that the quality of mitigation would improve because market partici-
pants would have incentive to ensure the highest possible productYiS 
This incentive would derive from a desire on the part of credit sup-
pliers not to incur the costs of mitigation failure. 159 
IV. FACILITATING EFFECTIVE WETLAND MITIGATION BANKING 
Market-based, wetland-mitigation banking has the potential to help 
regulators achieve the national goal of no-net-Ioss of wetlands more 
150 See, e.g., Shabman et aI., supra note 8, at 1; Sokolove & Huang, supra note 127, at 68. 
151 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 44; Foster, supra note 15, at 8. 
152 See Shabman et aI., supra note 8, at 12. 
153 See generally, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental 
Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 15-20 (1991); Robert W. Hahn 
& Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
361,362 (1989); Franz Thomas Litz, Comment, Harnessing Market Forces in Natural Resources 
Management: Lessons from the Surf Clam Fishery, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 335 (1994). 
154 See Shabman et aI., supra note 8, at 12-13; Hahn & Hester, supra note 153, at 361--63. 
155 See Haynes & Gardner, supra note 43, at 10261. An example of an existing marketable 
permit system is emissions trading in the air pollution control context. Id. See generally Hahn 
& Hester, supra note 153 (analyzing four different environmental regulatory programs which 
include marketable permit schemes). 
156 See Shabman et aI., supra note 8, at 12; Sokolove & Huang, supra note 125, at 68. 
157 Shabman et aI., supra note 8, at 12. 
158 See id. at 31-32. 
159 See id. 
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fairly and effectively than the current regulatory schemeYiO However, 
the success of mitigation banking depends on the development of 
regulatory policies which establish and further ecological and eco-
nomic goals. 
In developing regulatory policy with regard to mitigation and miti-
gation banking, policy makers must recognize two fundamental fac-
tors. First, regulators actually create the market for mitigation cred-
its through the very exercise of their regulatory functions. l6l If regulators 
did not require mitigation for wetland loss and degradation resulting 
from development projects, developers would not need to seek to 
purchase mitigation credits. Therefore, any regulatory policy which 
affects the amount or type of mitigation required in a given area 
necessarily affects the market for mitigation credits. 
Second, regulators are the only parties involved in a credit market 
with an intrinsic interest in the long-term value and success of miti-
gation projects.l62 Private mitigation bankers will desire to realize the 
highest profits. Presumably, they will achieve this goal through keep-
ing the cost of producing each credit at a minimum and sacrificing the 
quality of the mitigation.l63 This cost-cutting approach is unlikely to 
coincide with the goal of achieving high-quality, successful mitigation. 
Likewise, purchasers of credits will be motivated by a desire to pay 
as little as possible for those credits, not a desire to ameliorate envi-
ronmental harms.l64 
Consideration of these factors together yields the conclusion that 
it is incumbent upon regulators to ensure through regulation the 
solvency and quality of mitigation. But regulators must also recognize 
that most regulatory activity will affect the market for mitigation 
credits and the feasibility of establishing mitigation banks. Evidence 
of the dual consequences-environmental and market-of regulatory 
activity is apparent in many contexts.l65 
Five policy areas deserve particular attention. First, the use of 
advanced wetlands planning and classification can increase invest-
ment certainty for potential bank sponsors, while also providing valu-
able information regarding sites for and types of mitigation.l66 Second, 
wetlands classification should supplement, not replace, sequencing in 
100 See supra, text accompanying notes 55--87. 
161 Shabman et aI., supra note 8, at 20-21. 
162 Shabman et aI., supra note 8, at 21. 
163 See id. at 21. 
164 See id. 
165 See id. at 21-25. 
166 See infra, text accompanying notes 171-211. 
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regulating wetland mitigation and mitigation banking.l67 Third, the 
siting of mitigation banks should take place within the same water-
shed as anticipated wetland degradation.l68 Fourth, mitigation bank-
ing credits should only accrue where mitigation projects replace lost 
wetland values.l69 Finally, bank credits generally should be awarded 
only for mitigation which occurs in advance of development projects 
which will be mitigated through the use of those credits.170 
A. Advanced Identification and Watershed Planning 
The current scheme of wetlands regulation has been criticized for 
being protracted and uncertain.l7l Many experts agree that the key 
to improving wetlands protection in the United States is through the 
use of planning mechanisms, and that any mitigation banking system 
should be implemented in the context of a comprehensive wetlands 
plan.l72 
The goal of implementing such an approach is to shift away from 
the project-by-project approach to wetlands protection and manage-
ment.l73 The project-specific approach inhibits regulators from inte-
grating conservation objectives into the regulation of development.174 
Central to advanced planning and watershed management are the 
identification, mapping, and preliminary assessment of wetland func-
tions of all the wetlands within each watershed.175 With this informa-
tion available, regulators would be able to determine those types of 
wetlands and wetland functions that are in abundance within certain 
watersheds and those that are rare.176 
Such knowledge would allow for the classification of wetlands ac-
cording to their relative values within the watershed.l77 The particular 
class in which a wetland would fall would hinge on the wetlands's 
ecological value and on the difficulty of replacing the wetland func-
167 See irifra" text accompanying notes 212-239. 
168 See infra, text accompanying notes 240-254. 
169 See infra, text accompanying notes 255-268. 
170 See infra, text accompanying notes 269-282. 
171 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 125. 
172 See Foster, supra note 15, at 41-42 (summarizing statements of Christy Foote-Smith, 
Director of the Massachusetts Division of Wetlands and Waterways ("Watershed-based wetland 
planning may be the most appropriate means" of managing wetlands protection efforts». 
173 PROTECTING AMERICA'S WETLANDS, supra note 1, at 7. 
174 See id. 
175 See id. at 7-8. 
176 See Shabman et al., supra note 8, at 42. 
177 [d. at 17. 
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tions that would be lost if the wetland were to be destroyed or de-
graded. 178 
In addition to providing regulators with knowledge of the types of 
wetlands and wetlands functions that exist in particular watershed 
areas, watershed planning and advanced identification serve to nur-
ture the market for mitigation credits.179 Establishing restoration pri-
orities for various types of wetlands and wetland values within each 
watershed would create investment certainty for potential credit sup-
pliers by indicating which types of wetlands would most likely be 
certified by regulators and purchased by developers.18o Mitigation 
bankers would know where, what type, and how much mitigation to 
undertake within each planning area. 
Moreover, the information derived from advanced planning could 
actually lower the costs of undertaking mitigation in addition to maxi-
mizing the demand for mitigation.181 For instance, information regard-
ing the location of previously degraded wetlands would assist bank 
sponsors in the location of restoration sites.l82 Likewise, sponsors 
would benefit from information regarding hydrology and the presence 
of colonizing species in siting both restoration and creation projects.183 
Advanced planning would not only aid the supply side of the miti-
gation credit market; it would also be of benefit to the demand side. 
Planning processes can help permit applicants by identifying abun-
dant wetland types or degraded wetlands within the watershed.184 
This would provide applicants with information regarding which wet-
lands areas are more likely to be deemed appropriate for off-site 
mitigation.185 
Advance planning is useful in improving the ecological viability of 
mitigation efforts. Advance planning and classification are also vital 
to the establishment of a successful market for mitigation banking 
credits. Various planning and classification systems are currently avail-
able, and others have been proposed. To the extent that they further 
ecological and economic viability of mitigation and mitigation banking, 
these systems are desirable. Some of these planning systems, how-
ever, subordinate the primary goal of protecting wetland values to the 
178 See id. at 41-42. 
179 See id. at 22-23. 
18) See id. 
181 [d. at 23. 
182 [d. 
1&1 [d. 
184 See id. 
185 See id. 
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ancillary goal of increasing market certainty, and should not be incor-
porated into any wetland mitigation banking scheme. 
1. Advanced Planning Under the Clean Water Act 
While the current wetlands regulatory scheme is often criticized for 
focusing on specific projects instead of adopting a more comprehen-
sive approach, there is, in fact, a provision in the CWA for advanced 
identification.186 Advanced Identification (ADID) under the CWA in-
volves the collection of information about wetlands within defined 
areas.187 On the basis of this information, EPA and the Corps make a 
determination as to whether particular wetlands are suitable or un-
suitable for development.1ss 
These determinations are proactive and can help reduce uncer-
tainty for developers and bank operators by providing a method for 
evaluating the likelihood of permit issuance.l89 ADID can also assist 
regulators and planners by providing a framework for taking a more 
comprehensive approach to wetlands management.190 
While the ADID process has historically been used only to identify 
particularly vital wetlands that are inappropriate for fill, there is 
potential for ADID to play an important role in a more comprehensive 
watershed management approach.191 In addition to providing EPA 
and the Corps with a broader and more comprehensive management 
perspective, ADID implementation could be delegated to the states.l92 
This state involvement could be federally funded with conditions that 
states adopt comprehensive state wetlands strategies in accordance 
with EPA guidelines and that these plans be integrated with other 
management tools such as special area management plans193 and state 
certification of Corps permitting decisions.194 
186 33 U .S.C. § 1344; 40 C.F.R. 230.80 (1993). 
187 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 125; SALVESEN, supra note 8, at 38. 
188 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 125; SALVESEN, supra note 8, at 38. 
189 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 125; SALVESEN, supra note 8, at 38. 
190 SALVESEN, supra note 8, at 38. It must be stressed that a designation of a particular 
wetland as suitable for development does not amount to a guarantee that a permit to fill that 
wetland will be granted automatically, or that a permit is unattainable in a wetland designated 
as inappropriate for fill. Rather, ADID determinations are preliminary determinations intended 
only to provide guidance as to the appropriate use of particular wetlands. See ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW INST., supra note 10, at 125; SALVESEN, supra note 8, at 38. 
191 See Foote-Smith, supra note 181, at 4. 
192 See id. 
193 See id. 
194 [d. Under section 401 of the CWA, states have the authority to issue, condition, waive or 
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The advantage of expanding the ADID program in conjunction with 
instituting mitigation banking is that it provides potential credit ap-
plicants with valuable information about developable wetlands and 
about likely sites for mitigation banks.195 Of the 76 ADID programs 
that have been initiated, three have incorporated mitigation bank-
ing.196 The Columbia South Shore Wetlands Management Plan, which 
involved a survey of 40,000 acres in Oregon, envisioned a general 
regional permit for mitigation carried out through a mitigation bank.l97 
However, this ADID program has been suspended, and the general 
permit which the Corps had issued in February of 1992 has since been 
revoked.l98 The abandonment of the Columbia South Shore plan was 
due to a legal challenge by environmentalists.l99 
2. Advanced Planning Under the Coastal Zone Management Act 
Another possible tool for proactively designating wetlands as suit-
able or unsuitable for fill is the special area management plan (SAMP) 
provided for under the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA).2°O 
These plans apply to discrete and usually relatively small geographic 
areas.201 It is often the case that SAMPs are devised in connection 
with an ADID or a regional permit issued under section 404 of the 
CWA.2CJ2 
SAMPs differ from ADIDs in three significant respects. First, they 
only apply to "coastal zones."203 This clearly limits their applicabil-
ity to mitigation banking.204 Secondly, SAMPs are developed by the 
deny water quality certification for federal permits and licenses. Unless a state grants or waives 
section 401 certification, the Corps cannot issue a section 404 permit. 33 u.s.c. § 1341 (1988). 
196 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 126. 
196 [d. at 125. 
197 [d. at 125-26. 
198 [d. at 126. 
199 [d. (citing Northwest Envtl. Defense Ctr. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 806 F. 
Supp. 891 (D. Or. 1992». 
200 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (1988). CZMA defines a SAMP as: "a comprehensive plan providing 
for natural resource protection and reasonable coastal-dependent economic growth containing 
a detailed and comprehensive statement of policies; standards and criteria to guide public and 
private uses of lands and waters; and mechanisms for timely implementation in specific geo-
graphic areas within the coastal zone." 16 U.S.C. § 1453(17). 
201 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 128. 
2tr2 [d. 
20016 U.S.C. § 1453(1) (Supp. v 1993). Coastal zones are defined as "coastal waters ... and the 
adjacent shore lands," and wetlands. [d. 
204 Although, it should be noted that the Corps has expanded its use of SAMP procedures to 
wetlands beyond coastal zones. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 128. 
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states, rather than by federal agencies.205 This allows for better incor-
poration of state and local concerns.206 Finally, unlike ADIDs, SAMPs 
are legally binding, and states may base their coastal permit decisions 
on them.207 
In addition, the Memorandum of Agreement between the Corps 
and EPA exempts development projects that are carried out accord-
ing to SAMPs from the normal sequencing procedure mitigation for 
wetland losses.208 This exemption would apply to mitigation banks 
established in connection with SAMPs.209 The opportunity to avoid 
sequencing within the area covered by SAMPs will be attractive to 
developers.21o 
The avoidance of sequencing would also promote the mitigation 
credit market. Wetland development within areas designated for de-
velopment could be mitigated through the purchase of mitigation 
credits. Demand for mitigation credits would rise, thereby increasing 
investment certainty for bank producers. However, the potential for 
significant losses of wetland values exists where SAMPs are not truly 
comprehensive.211 Therefore, extra care must be taken to ensure that 
SAMP approval only takes place upon a showing that all relevant 
ecological considerations have been addressed. 
B. The Combined Role of Sequencing and Wetland Classification 
in Wetland Mitigation Banking 
While the primary purpose of regulating development in wetlands 
is to protect wetland resources, it also affects the demand for mitiga-
tion credits. Demand for mitigation banking credits is a function of 
pressure to develop wetlands and government-imposed compensa-
205 See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 127-28. 
206 I d. at 128. 
2071d. at 127. The study only found one SAMP that explicitly incorporated mitigation banking. 
This SAMP, developed for the Port of Pascagoula in Jackson County, Mississippi, was initiated 
to address pressures on the Mississippi Gulf Coast due to development, shipbuilding and oil 
refineries. The Pascagoula SAMP includes plans for the future development of the port area as 
well as plans for mitigation and disposal of dredge material, and it provides varying levels of 
protection according to the types and locations of wetlands. A bank was established through 
the acquisition and preservation of 3,500 acres 'of wetlands in the area. The credits from this 
bank are intended only to offset wetland losses resulting from eight pre-designated development 
projects. ld. at 128. 
208 MOA, supra note 22. 
209 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 129. 
21°ld. 
211 ld. 
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tory mitigation requirements.212 Without development pressure, no 
credit market will develop.213 Likewise, no market will develop if 
regulators either always deny permits for wetland development or 
permit such development without requiring compensatory mitiga-
tion.214 
The sequencing approach currently employed in regulating wetland 
development215 has significant effects on the credit market, as well as 
environmental implications.216 Avoidance of unnecessary wetlands im-
pacts is the purpose of requiring developers to seek to avoid and 
minimize impacts on wetlands before resorting to compensatory miti-
gation.217 
Critics denounce the sequencing procedure, arguing that it reduces 
the demand for permits and credits218 and discourages entry into the 
credit-supply market.219 These critics insist that regulatory reform 
would facilitate the creation of credit markets.220 By introducing an 
element of flexibility regarding avoidance and minimization, reform-
ers argue, regulators could increase wetlands values while increasing 
demand for mitigation credits.221 
Others argue that inconsistency in the permitting process, rather 
than the sequencing procedure itself, poses the greatest threat to the 
viability of mitigation credit markets.222 They argue that if sequencing 
were always required, a predictable level of demand for mitigation 
credits by permit applicants whose projects did satisfy sequencing 
requirements would remain.223 The elimination of sequencing, on the 
other hand, would result in higher demand for mitigation credits, but 
would not substantially increase predictability.224 The only way se-
quencing might actually affect the viability of mitigation banking 
would be if it denied virtually all wetland development.225 The infer-
ence to be made from this argument is that the predictability of 
212 Id, at 117. 
213Id. 
214Id. See also Shabman et a!., supra note 8, at 23. 
215 See supra, text accompanying notes 26-29. 
216 See Shabman et a!., supra note 8, at 23. 
217 45 Fed. Reg. 85338--85339 (Dec. 24, 1980). 
218 Shabman et a!., supra note 8, at 23. 
219 Michael R. Deland, No Net Loss of Wetlands: A Comprehensive Approach, NAT. RE-
SOURCE & ENV'T 3, 5 (Summer 1992). 
2aJ Shabman et a!., supra note 8, at 37; Deland, supra note 219, at 5. 
221 Shabman et a!., supra note 8, at 38. 
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demand, not its magnitude, is an essential prerequisite for credit 
market.226 
The goal of increased predictability is not inconsistent with the goal 
of greater flexibility in the sequencing process. Advocates of a credit 
market system view wetlands classification as a solution to both prob-
lems.227 Such classification would supplement sequencing with a for-
mulaic approach which would, based on the application of various 
classification criteria, assign each wetland to a particular category.228 
In turn, various levels of regulatory oversight would apply to wet-
lands within each category.229 Presumably, stricter oversight would 
result in stricter application of sequencing and of on-site, in-kind 
mitigation preferences.23o 
The criteria used to classify wetlands should include ecological value,231 
difficulty of mitigating lost wetlands values,232 and economic and social 
value of development.233 
The first criterion, ecological value, is a function of the scarcity of 
and need for the particular wetlands type within the watershed and 
the potential for future degradation of a wetland even if development 
226 In fact, most studies and government guidelines on mitigation retain sequencing, and allow 
the use of mitigation banking credits only when alternative sites and plans would not obviate 
the need for offsite compensatory mitigation. See, e.g., SHORT, supra note 36, at 8; MEMORAN-
DUM TO THE FIELD, supra note 55, at 2. 
Regulators' reluctance to depart from the traditional sequencing methodology may stem from 
the notion that certain development projects are more suitable for off-site compensatory miti-
gation, and thus mitigation banking, than others. See REGION IX GUIDELINES, supra note 47, 
at 3. According to one EPA region, projects appropriate for off-site mitigation and mitigation 
banking include: 
Id. 
1. Projects that require access or proximity to, or siting in, the aquatic environment 
(i.e., "water dependent" projects). 
2. Projects whose unavoidable impacts are very small, wetlands that are isolated or 
fragmented, or aquatic habitats that have minimal existing or potentially restorable 
functional values. 
3. Linear projects (e.g., highways, pipelines, transmission lines, canals) that tend to 
result in numerous minor, but cumulatively significant, impacts to multiple aquatic 
areas. 
4. Projects involving minor or routine repair and maintenance of existing public struc-
tures where mitigation might otherwise not occur (e.g., maintenance of bridges, clean-
ing of drainage ditches). 
227 See Shabman et aI., supra note 8, at 39-47; Deland, supra note 219, at 5. 
228 Shabman et aI., supra note 8, at 41; Deland, supra note 219, at 5. 
229 See Shabman et aI., supra note 8, at 41. 
230 See Deland, supra note 219, at 5. 
231 Shabman et aI., supra note 8, at 42; Deland, supra note 219, at 5. 
232 Shabman et aI., supra note 8, at 42. 
233 See Shabman et aI., supra note 8, at 42; Deland, supra note 219, at 5. 
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of the wetland itself is denied.234 For example, a small patch of forested 
swamp bordering a highway on one side and a condominium project 
on another is unlikely to have great ecological value. This is particu-
larly true if there are many other forested swamps within the same 
watershed, because it will most likely be degraded in the near future 
anyway. However, a large stretch of salt marsh which does not border 
any adulterative influences possesses significant ecological value, es-
pecially if it is the only such pristine stretch of salt marsh in the area. 
The second classification criterion concerns the difficulty of replac-
ing lost wetlands values through compensatory mitigation.235 Avail-
ability of appropriate mitigation sites within the same watershed and 
the scientific success rate of replicating or restoring particular types 
of wetlands are relevant considerations in applying this criterion. 
The third category concerns the economic and social value of devel-
opment.236 Clearly, regulators impose a greater burden on landowners 
where they prevent potentially lucrative development projects. How-
ever, high economic returns on development enable landowners to pay 
for more mitigation.237 Consequently, regulators could demand higher 
ratios of mitigation to degradation-mitigation ratios-from land-
owners earning high returns from development than from those re-
ceiving smaller returns. 
If regulators weigh each of these factors carefully in classifying and 
regulating the development of wetlands, benefits may accrue jointly 
to the watershed and the credit market. Such a classification system 
could continue to stress avoidance as being, presumably, the most 
appropriate option.238 But it could also facilitate the introduction of 
other considerations into the permitting process, such as the oppor-
tunity costs incurred by, and actual relative environmental benefits 
derived from, the prevention of wetlands development.239 
C. Siting of Wetland Mitigation Banking Efforts 
Bank sponsors must receive agency approval of the location and 
physical characteristics of proposed banks.240 Siting of banks is a criti-
234 See Shabman et aI., supra note 8, at 42. 
235 [d. 
236 See id. at 45. 
237 [d. at 45. 
238 See id. at 45. 
239 See id. at 45. 
240 See, e.g., CALIFORNIA GUIDELINES, supra note 44, at 5-11. 
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cal component of a mitigation banking program.241 Generally, mitiga-
tion banks should be located within the same watershed as, or at least 
in close proximity to, the projects they are intended to mitigate.242 By 
requiring that banks be located near areas of expected future wet-
lands development, regulators can help to ensure that wetlands val-
ues are not stripped from one watershed and replaced in another.243 
Mitigation banks should also be located in areas where the potential 
for impacts by present and future land uses is minimized.244 To protect 
mitigation bank sites further from future degradation by adjacent 
land uses, many studies and guidelines recommend that regulators 
require buffer zones for each bank.245 No mitigation credits would 
accrue from these buffer zones.246 Therefore, the more acreage of 
buffer that regulators require, the higher the price of credits will be.247 
Of course, it is also important that the site chosen for a mitigation 
bank possesses the appropriate physical characteristics to facilitate 
compensation for anticipated losses of wetlands values.248 Therefore, 
the bank should encompass desirable habitat types for species ad-
versely impacted by development projects.249 
In addition, bank sites must have adequate water sources to sup-
port the appropriate type of wetland ecosystem.250 This is extremely 
important because, without a sufficient and reliable water supply, the 
chances of a bank being an ecological success are low.251 Mitigation 
241 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 63. One major study of mitigation banking 
views early attention to bank siting considerations as being "the most important factor affecting 
the potential usefulness of mitigation banks as an effective instrument of wetland protection." 
[d. at 75. 
242 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 75; CALIFORNIA GUIDELINES, supra note 
44, at 5; SHORT, supra note 36, at 13. 
243 See REGION IX GUIDELINES, supra note 47, at 4; CALIFORNIA GUIDELINES, supra note 
44, at 5; SHORT, supra note 36, at 13. 
244 CALIFORNIA GUIDELINES, supra note 44, at 5. 
245 E.g., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 72; CALIFORNIA GUIDELINES, supra 
note 44, at 6. 
246 CALIFORNIA GUIDELINES, supra note 44, at 6. 
247 See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 72. 
248 See SHORT, supra note 36, at 26. 
249 [d. 
250 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 72; CALIFORNIA GUIDELINES, supra note 
44, at 9. 
251 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 72. Mitigation banking efforts have actually 
been suspended due to long-term drought conditions. One such bank is the 150-acre Mud Lake 
Wildlife Management Area mitigation bank established by the Idaho Transportation Depart-
ment in Jefferson County, Idaho. [d. at 72, apps. A & B. 
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plans should also ensure that the use of such a water source does not 
adversely impact other wildlife resources and habitats.252 
Regulators must consider these ecological factors in determining 
whether certain sites are appropriate for mitigation bank develop-
ment. However, more restrictive requirements will result in a pre-
mium on suitable mitigation bank sites and will reduce the supply of 
credits available to the market.253 Moreover, as with any aspect of 
government involvement, lack of government specificity and consis-
tency with regard to siting criteria can exacerbate market uncer-
tainty.254 Bank regulators also should consider these facts in promul-
gating siting standards and in making bank permitting decisions. 
D. Allowable Mitigation 
Related to the issue of bank siting is the type of mitigation which 
will provide banking credits. Banking credits should only be awarded 
for mitigation efforts which effectively replace lost wetland values. 
Restoration is generally considered the most appropriate form of 
mitigation.255 Restoration is favored over creation of new wetlands 
because it is generally considered to be more successful than crea-
tion.256 This results from the fact that preexisting hydrological and 
wildlife conditions are available to facilitate restoration of wetland 
values.257 
Restoration is also preferred to enhancement because it only en-
hances particular wetlands functions, rather than replacing entire 
wetlands.258 Moreover, such enhancement often jeopardizes other un-
enhanced wetland traits.259 
Lastly, "preservation is the most controversial type of mitigation."260 
The primary argument against allowing preservation of existing wet-
lands to compensate for the destruction of other wetlands is that, 
unlike with restoration or creation, a net loss of wetlands results.261 
252 CALIFORNIA GUIDELINES, supra note 44, at 9. 
253 See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 74-75. 
254 See id. at 75. 
255 I d. at 55. 
256 SALVESEN, supra note 8, at 81, 96; ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 53-55. 
257 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 54. 
258 See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 54. 
259 SALVESEN, supra note 8, at 89. 
260 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 54. 
261 Haynes & Gardner, supra note 43, at 10263; ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, 
at 54; REGION IX GUIDELINES, supra note 53, at 4; SHORT, supra note 36, at 6. 
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Others argue, however, that the use of preservation in a mitigation 
banking system has its advantages. First, it can result in the protec-
tion of high-value, difficult-to-replace wetlands that would otherwise 
be degraded or destroyed in the near future.262 If preservation is 
allowed only in conjunction with monitoring and maintenance require-
ments, wetlands losses that may have occurred otherwise may be 
avoided.263 The other advantage offered in favor of preservation is the 
avoidance of regulatory takings by agencies that prohibit landowners 
from filling wetlands on their land.264 Despite these perceived advan-
tages, very few existing mitigation banks are "preservation" banks.265 
Some guidelines and proposals suggest the use of variable mitiga-
tion ratios to compensate for the use of less preferred mitigation 
types.266 EPA Region IV, for instance, has issued draft guidance which 
establishes mitigation ratios of 2:1 for restoration, 3:1 for creation, 4:1 
for enhancement, and 10:1 for preservation.267 
Regulators should adopt a policy which will result in the most 
effective replacement of wetland values which are lost due to devel-
opment. A different "sequencing" scheme which reflects preferences 
of compensatory mitigation types may achieve this goal. Restoration 
of previously degraded wetlands should be presumed to be the only 
appropriate form of mitigation. The burden should be on bank spon-
sors who wish to create credits through the initiation of any other 
type of mitigation to show why restoration is not possible or will not 
produce the most ecologically beneficial results. 
Variable credit ratios, such as those advanced by EPA Region IV,268 
should be used to supplement this mitigation type preference system. 
For example, a bank sponsor can establish that wetlands creation is 
the best mitigation option in a particular area because no appropriate 
restoration sites are available. In such a case, regulators should re-
quire a higher mitigation credit ratio. Regulators may choose to allow 
for some flexibility in requiring higher mitigation ratios in appropriate 
circumstances. Again, however, the burden of showing why higher 
ratios are not necessary to ensure full replacement of wetland func-
tions should be on the bank sponsor. 
262 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 55; SHORT, supra note 36, at 6. 
263 See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supm note 10, at 55. 
264 Haynes & Gardner, supm note 49, at 10262-63. See supm text accompanying notes 95-110. 
265 See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supm note 10, at 55. 
266 See id. 
267 [d. 
268 See supm text accompanying note 267. 
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Establishing a preference system for different types of mitigation 
and requiring higher mitigation credit ratios for lower-preference 
mitigation types in most circumstances will result in more effective 
replacement of lost wetlands values. Providing for some flexibility in 
the types of mitigation allowable and the level at which mitigation 
ratios are set will provide bank sponsors with more options for creat-
ing mitigation credits. In addition to nurturing the credit market, this 
flexibility will encourage research and development of more effective 
mitigation technology. If credit producers know that more effective 
mitigation will result in lower credit ratios, they will be more likely 
to invest in seeking to improve mitigation technology. Therefore, both 
the quality and efficiency of mitigation will improve. 
E. Advance Mitigation 
One of the most extolled advantages of wetlands mitigation banking 
is the fact that mitigation occurs prior to the degradation for which it 
is compensating.269 Some proposals, however, advocate relaxation of 
the requirement that mitigation be completed before credits can be 
sold.270 Proponents of such relaxation argue that the requirement of a 
sizable up-front capital outlay, without the prospect of any return on 
investment for several years after mitigation costs are incurred, will 
deter potential credit producers from entering the market.271 
Another perceived problem is the disparity that exists between the 
advance mitigation requirement of mitigation banking and the rather 
lax temporal requirements associated with on-site, project-specific 
mitigation efforts.272 Critics of strict advance mitigation requirements 
maintain that permit applicants will not be able to pursue the option 
of purchasing mitigation banking credits because this disparity will 
drive up the price of credits and that banks will be competitively 
disadvantaged.273 
The argument that this disparity in regulatory control puts mitiga-
tion banking at a disadvantage does not necessarily indicate a need 
for relaxing advance mitigation requirements for mitigation banks. 
The problem could be solved just as well by "leveling the playing 
269 E.g., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 153; REGION IX GUIDELINES, supra 
note 47, at 1. See supra, text accompanying notes 55-B2. 
270 See Shabman et ai., supra note 8, at 26. 
271 FLORIDA ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 56, at 13; Shabman et ai., supra note 
8, at 26; ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 59-60. 
272 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 59. 
273 [d. at 59. 
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field" by requiring advance mitigation for on-site mitigation projects 
as well as for mitigation banking efforts.274 This is desirable from an 
ecological point of view as well, since it will reduce the probability of 
mitigation failure for on-site projects. 
Advocates of relaxing the advance mitigation requirements offer 
two general alternative policies to guard against mitigation failure-
the main function which prior mitigation is intended to perform. One 
means of resolving the difficulties associated with requiring fully 
functional wetland mitigation to be in place before allowing the sale 
of any credits is to require higher mitigation ratios for credits distrib-
uted prior to full functional maturity of a mitigation bank.275 This is 
similar to the notion of adjusting mitigation ratios according to the 
type of mitigation performed by a credit producer.276 Variable mitiga-
tion ratios are also an allowable means of providing for credit with-
drawal prior to full functional maturity under the EPA/Corps guid-
ance.277 
Another way of protecting against net wetland losses due to miti-
gation failure is to allow incremental distribution of credits according 
to the level of wetland functions that have been established.278 EPA 
and Corps guidelines provide for such incremental distribution in 
some cases.279 However, a credit supplier seeking to distribute credits 
in advance of fully functional mitigation must "demonstrate that the 
mitigation has been or will be successful in offsetting project-re-
lated impacts."28o Requirements regarding financial guarantees, main-
tenance and monitoring, and assurances for any necessary future 
remediation can supplement a system which allows for incremental 
distribution.281 Moreover, design, construction, establishment of nec-
essary hydrology, and other initial steps necessary for the estab-
274 [d. at 60. 
275 [d.; Shabman et aI., supra note 8, at 33. 
276 See supra, text accompanying notes 26~267. 
277 MEMORANDUM TO THE FIELD, supra note 55, at 3-4. 
278 See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 60. 
279 See, e.g., REGION IX GUIDELINES, supra note 47, at 5; MEMORANDUM TO THE FIELD, supra 
note 55, at 2. 
280 REGION IX GUIDELINES, supra note 47, at 5. 
281 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 60. The types of financial guarantees 
regulators can require of credit producers include surety bonds, trust funds, escrow accounts, 
sinking funds, insurance, self-bonds, and corporate guarantees. [d. at 105. 
In Florida, for example, credit producers must post bonds and follow mitigation schedules. If 
a credit producer falls behind in its mitigation responsibilities, the state Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection can take over the mitigation effort and cash the bond to finance the 
mitigation. Tulman Interview, supra note 126. 
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lishment of a mitigation bank at least should be completed before 
credit sales are allowed.282 
By allowing credits to accrue, in certain circumstances, before miti-
gation projects reach full functional maturity, regulators can relieve 
some of the risks of investing in mitigation banking projects. Variable 
mitigation ratios and incremental credit distribution both offer viable 
means of allowing earlier credit accrual while still protecting against 
mitigation failure. These options, however, should not be automat-
ically available to potential bank sponsors. Many types of investments 
require large capital outlays without the prospect of immediate re-
turn. Bank sponsors should have to make a showing that requiring 
advance mitigation would make their specific projects infeasible in 
order to be eligible for pre-maturity credits. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Wetland mitigation banking has the potential to facilitate the reali-
zation of the national goal of no-net-Ioss of wetlands, and perhaps a 
net gain of wetlands in the future. However, mitigation banking is not 
a panacea for the regulatory ills that are allowing America's wetlands 
to be destroyed at such an alarming rate. Banking cannot succeed in 
a vacuum, but must be undertaken in conjunction with other regula-
tory and policy reforms which will allow for a viable credit market 
while ensuring the ecological integrity of mitigation projects. 
Watershed planning must replace the project-specific approach now 
prevalent in the wetland development permitting process. Sequenc-
ing should be presumed to govern, but regulators should use wetland 
classification to provide sufficient flexibility to ensure that mitigation 
banking is a viable mitigation option where appropriate. In addition, 
mitigation banking projects should be sited in areas where they are 
needed and where there are sufficient environmental resources to 
support them. It is also important for regulators to restrict mitigation 
which will produce credits to those types of mitigation which will 
ensure full replacement of lost wetland values. Restoration should be 
presumed to be the most appropriate form of mitigation. Again, how-
ever, there should be sufficient flexibility to allow for other types of 
mitigation where bank sponsors can demonstrate that they will maxi-
mize environmental benefit. Finally, while regulators should generally 
protect against mitigation failure by requiring advance mitigation, 
variable credit ratios and incremental credit distribution can serve 
282 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., supra note 10, at 60. 
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the same purpose where strict advance mitigation requirements would 
otherwise prevent the initiation of mitigation banking. Finally, bank 
credits generally should be awarded only for mitigation which occurs 
in advance of development projects which will be mitigated through 
the use of those credits. 
